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Practice and Procedure Before Racing
Commissions
By JEWEL N. KLEIN* AND RAY H. GARISON**
Horse racing is a publicly sponsored sport that depends upon
legalized betting under the pari-mutuel system for its vitality. The
activity is subject to strict control and regulation, under the state
police power, by a racing commission or other agency in each of
the states that permit pari-mutuel wagering.' The principal purpose
of legislation that allows betting on horse racing is to generate
state revenue. 2 Other purposes behind such legislation include en-
couragement of the horse breeding industry, protection of the
health of the horse, and prevention of schemes to defraud racing's
patrons.3
* Partner in the firm of Holstein, Mack & Klein, Chicago, Illinois; General Counsel,
Illinois Racing Board 1974-1986; B.A., Brandeis University, 1963; J.D., University of
Chicago, 1966.
** Attorney Consultant, Navistar International Corporation; Member, Illinois Racing
Board 1975-1988; Member, Illinois Thoroughbred Breeders Fund Advisory Board, 1976-
1980; B.A., Western Kentucky University, 1942; M.A., University of Kentucky, 1944; J.D.,
University of Chicago, 1949.
State ex rel. Morris v. West Virginia Racing Comm'n, 55 S.E.2d 263, 270 (W.Va.
1949) ("Whatever may be said in favor of horse racing, and much can be said, it must be
admitted that great evil attends its practice, such as calls for the intervention of the state,
under its police power. . . ."); Tweel v. West Virginia Racing Comm'n, 76 S.E.2d 874
(W.Va. 1953); Lombardo v. DiSandro, 103 A.2d 557, 557 (R.I. 1954) ("It is generally
recognized that horse racing for stakes or reward, although permitted by law, is of such a
nature as to demand in the public interest strict control ... ."); O'Daniel v. Ohio State
Racing Comm'n, 307 N.E.2d 529, 533 (Ohio 1974) ("[H]orse racing is one of those fields
subject to extraordinarily broad regulatory powers.") (relying in part on Western Turf Ass'n
v. Greenburg, 204 U.S. 359 (1907)).
2 People ex reL Scott v. Illinois Racing Bd., 301 N.E.2d 285, 288 (Ill. 1973); Hubel
v. West Virginia Racing Comm'n, 513 F.2d 240, 243 (4th Cir. 1975); Bay State Harness
Horse Racing & Breeding Ass'n, Inc. v. State Racing Comm'n, 184 N.E.2d 38, 39 (Mass.
1962) (in reviewing applications by competitors for racing dates, the commission may
consider, as an aspect of the public interest, the comparative size of the pari-mutuel handle
and consequent state revenue).
3 Ky. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 230.215(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982) [hereinafter K.R.S.];
Hubel v. West Virginia Racing Comm'n, 513 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1975). Some states permit
pari-mutuel wagering on dog or mule racing or jai alai but these are not treated separately.
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I. NATURE AND STRUCTURE OF COMMAISSIONS
Racing in each state is governed by that state's racing statute,
which creates the state's racing commission or agency that regulates
racing. The members of the various state racing commissions are
political appointees of the governor. 4 In a majority of the racing
states, all appointments to the commission are required to have
the approval of the state senate. Kentucky does not require such
approval. 5
Most state racing commissions have generally attracted persons
who are dedicated to public service without regard for financial
compensation. Most commissioners are unsalaried and are paid
only token remuneration. 6 Many commissioners have other full-
time occupations since their duties as racing commissioners require
only part of their time. Only New York and Michigan have full-
time racing commissioners.
The membership of the commissions ranges from one commis-
sioner in Michigan to thirteen members of the Kentucky Harness
Racing Commission.7 Illinois, Louisiana, and Minnesota each have
nine members. The Kentucky State Racing Commission, which
regulates thoroughbred racing, currently has nine members.8 The
typical number of members is three or five.
In March, 1985, the thirty-six-member Governor's Task Force
on Horse Racing in Illinois recommended, as a reform measure,
that the size of the Illinois Racing Board be reduced from seven
members to five.9 The Illinois legislature, however, increased the
membership of the board from seven to nine.10
4 On July 8, 1981, Louisiana Governor David C. Treen enjoined the Louisiana Racing
Commission from holding any meetings until he had named the new members to the
commission. This resulted in a delay of hearings on pending appeals, thereby violating
several trainers' right to a prompt hearing. See Delahoussaye v. Louisiana State Racing
Comm'n, 446 So. 2d 490 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
These conclusions are based upon a survey of the various state racing statutes. See,
e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 8, para. 37-24 (Smith-Hurd 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 201 (vest
1989).
6 E.g., Kentucky pays $50 per day for each meeting attended. K.R.S. § 230.220.
Minnesota pays $35 per day spent on commission activities, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 240.02
(West 1989). Oklahoma allows $50 per day. OK.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 3A, § 203D (West 1989).
7 K.R.S. § 230.622; Roster of National Association of State Racing Commissioners
(now Association of Racing Commissioners International) (May 1988) [hereinafter NASRC
or ARCI].
I K.R.S. § 230.220; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 240.02; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 8, para. 37-4.
9 13 ILLNoIs RAcINO NEws 26-30 (April 1985).
10 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 8, para. 37-4 (1989).
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Under a 1982 statute, two members of the thoroughbred and
harness racing commissions in Kentucky were appointed by the
President Pro Tempore of the Kentucky Senate and the Speaker
of the Kentucky House." This statute was declared invalid as
violative of the separation of powers doctrine.12
Most states that permit both thoroughbred and harness racing
have commissions with combined jurisdiction over both types of
racing. Delaware, Kentucky, and Pennsylvania, however, have sep-
arate commissions for each type of racing. 3
Arizona has both the Department of Racing and the Arizona
Racing Commission. Hearing officers for the department conduct
administrative hearings and make recommendations as to depart-
mental decisions, which are the ultimate responsibility of the di-
rector. Upon request for review, the commission will conduct a
hearing on the director's decision.' 4 In Florida, the Division of
Pari-Mutuel Wagering conducts disciplinary hearings 5 while the
allocation of dates is left to the Florida Pari-Mutuel Commission.
Prior to 1965, Illinois had both a thoroughbred and a harness
racing commission with separate statutes and regulations .16 The
Illinois Supreme Court, however, considered the two separate leg-
islative acts as integral parts of the state's comprehensive plan for
regulation of racing.1 7
A single commission with authority to regulate both thorough-
bred and harness racing, under a common racing statute with one
set of rules and regulations, enhances the development of a com-
prehensive racing policy. This structure facilitates uniformity and
evenhandedness, but allows for an exception where necessary to
reflect significantly disparate industry practices.
The avoidance of an appearance of impropriety, conflict of
interest, or preferential treatment is essential to the image of any
racing commission. In Helad Farms v. Pennsylvania State Harness
Commission,' the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania declared
" K.R.S. §§ 230.220(1), 230.620(2) (Interim Supp. 1982).
12 Legislative Research Comm'n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907, 915 (Ky. 1984).
,3 NASRC, supra note 7; 1988 DIRECTORY OF HARNESS TRACKS OF AMERICA 58-62.
" Oliver v. Arizona Dep't of Racing, 708 P.2d 764, 765 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).
11 Solimena v. State Dep't of Bus. Reg., 402 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. App. 1981), rev.
denied, 412 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1982).
16 1965 ILL. LAWS 1346.
People ex rel. Scott v. Illinois Racing Bd., 301 N.E.2d 285, 289 (Iil. 1973).
" 470 A.2d 181 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984) (commission employee waived the deadline
for stakes payments for one horse owner but refused to do so for other owners).
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that the overriding purpose of Pennsylvania's racing statute is "to
foster an image of horse racing that would make the image of that
'industry' an irreproachable one, even in the eyes of the skeptical
public." 19 A racing commissioner who is subject to bias, prejudice,
or other partial interest in any matter before the commission or-
dinarily is disqualified from participation in that matter.20 As in-
dicated by the court in Helad Farms, "[e]venhandedness in the
treatment of horseowners by the Commission is an absolute. ' 21
All but a few states prohibit racing commissioners from holding
any financial interest in any aspect of racing within their state.'2
Many states also prohibit racing commissioners from owning horses
that race in their state. Several states, particularly those that have
recently legalized pari-mutuel wagering, prohibit commissioners from
betting on races in their state.23 Kentucky, on the other hand,
requires its thoroughbred commission to have no fewer than two
breeders and two horsemen among its membership. At least one
of the nine members must have "no financial interest in the busi-
ness or industry regulated." 24 Racing commissions generally func-
tion best where their membership is balanced, and the public
interest is served through broad representation on the commission.
The most important powers granted to the commissions include
allocation of racing dates, promulgation of rules and regulations,2
19 Id. at 184.
20 Wilkey v. Illinois Racing Bd., 449 N.E.2d 843 (Ill. 1983) (trial court remanded case
to racing board for new hearing where one board member, who participated in an investi-
gation of the race, also participated in the adjudicatory hearing; appeal to Supreme Court
dismissed). But see Solimena, 402 So. 2d 1240 (court held the failure of the division director
to recuse himself was harmless error where newspapers had reported the director's views
on the rule that the trainer allegedly violated); DeGroot v. Arizona Racing Comm'n, 686
P.2d 1301, 1310-1311 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) (statement by one commissioner to witness
prior to hearing was held not to be a denial of due process).
21 Helad Farms v. Pennsylvania State Racing Comm'n, 470 A.2d 181, 185 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1984).
= See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 8, para. 37-6; MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 240, § 240.02;
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 3A, § 202 (West Supp. 1989).
11 See, e.g., MmIN. STAT. ANN. ch. 240, § 240.28(2); N.Y. RACING, PARI-MTrrUEL
WAGERING AND BREEDING LAW § 104 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 3A § 203.13 (West Supp. 1989); Wis.- STAT. ANN. § 562.025(d) (West Supp. 1989). The
Commission on the Review of the National Policy Toward Gambling, created by Congress
in the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 in its final report, GAmmLING IN AmERICA
(1976), recommended that states prohibit commissioners from betting on races in their state.
K.R.S. § 230.220.
Although each racing state has its own set of rules, there is considerable similarity
in the rules adopted by the various states. On April 16, 1986, the NASRC adopted a set of
uniform rules for regulation of both thoroughbred and harness racing. These rules, of
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licensing of racing participants, and the conduct of disciplinary
hearings for those who violate the rules. The commissions have no
inherent powers. Their powers come exclusively from the legislature
as set forth in the racing statute. 2
6
Horse owners, trainers, jockeys, drivers, backstretch personnel
and concessionaires are among those usually required to obtain an
occupational license and pay the license fee. In the absence of
statutory authorization, racing commissions lack the authority to
set the price for programs sold at the tracks27 or to set the fees to
be paid to jockeys. 2 However, a racing commission and its mem-
bers have been held to be immune from antitrust liability where
the jockey fee schedule, as authorized by the legislature, reflects a
clearly articulated state policy and is actively supervised. 29
II. THE PRE-COMMISSION STAGES
A. Stewards and Judges
In thoroughbred and quarterhorse racing, the chief racing of-
ficials at the race track are usually called stewards. In standardbred
racing, although the term is somewhat falling out of favor, the
stewards are generally referred to as "judges". These are the
gentlemen, and lately a few ladies, who decide the outcome of the
contest.
The function of stewards varies somewhat from state to state
but their most visible duty is to preside over the actual conduct of
the race, determining which horse crossed the finish line first, and
course, are only advisory and are designed for use by the various commissions in drafting
their own rules. PROCEEDINOS OF NASRC 74 (1986). In an effort to adopt uniform rules of
racing, the ARCI has embarked on a project whereby all current commission rules are being
computerized.
McIlmurray v. Michigan Racing Comm'r, 343 N.W.2d 524, 526 (Mich. App. 1983).
2,Ogden/Fairmount, Inc. v. Illinois Racing Bd., 332 N.E.2d 610, 613 (Ill. App. 1975).
21 Horsemen's Benevolent & Protective Ass'n v. Illinois Racing Bd., 289 N.E.2d 421,
423 (Il1. 1972). But see Gilligan v. Pennsylvania Horse Racing Comm'n, 422 A.2d 487, 491
(Pa. 1980), where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that the legislature, through their
acquiescence, had approved the commission's jockey fee schedule.
29Euster v. Eagle Downs Racing Ass'n, 677 F.2d 992 (3rd Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1022 (1982). The West Virginia Racing Commission has been held to be consti-
tutionally immune from a damage suit by a jockey alleging negligence on the part of the
commission in regulating conduct of jockeys at a track. Santiago v. Clark, 444 F. Supp.
1077, 1079 (D.W. Va. 1978). Likewise, stewards in West Virginia were held immune from




whether the competition was conducted in accordance with the
commission's rules. Aided by sophisticated photo finish and video
cameras, and often linked by telephone or walkie-talkie to patrol
judges or other ground-level officials, the stewards are generally
stationed atop the clubhouse or grandstand immediately above the
finish line. When the race has concluded, if there has been a photo
finish or if one horse interferes with another, the stewards use the
camera and telephone to review the race and declare the official
order of finish for the purpose of paying pari-mutuel tickets. Where
necessary, the stewards may even communicate directly with the
jockeys or drivers before declaring the race official.
At all pari-mutuel race tracks, there are three stewards. In most
states, two stewards are appointed and employed by the state and
the third is appointed by the track and approved by the racing
commission.30 In other states, only one steward is employed by the
state and the other two are employed by the track subject to
commission approval.3 1 In a third variant, all three stewards are
employed by the state but their salaries are charged back to the
racing associations. 32 In New York, the thoroughbred stewards
include one employed by the state, one employed by the track, and
one employed by The Jockey Club.33
For the thousands of participants in pari-mutuel racing, the
stewards have a role far more important than judging the race. By
statute,34 or by rule, 35 the stewards "are charged with the respon-
sibility of enforcing the rules and regulations of the Commis-
sion .... In a sense, they are the 'policemen' of the Commission. ' 36
The duties of a steward generally include review of license appli-
cations, recommendation to the commission, consideration of rule
violations, imposition of penalties, supervision of the entries and
carding of races, 37 as well as supervision of other commission
personnel at the race track.
Depending on the length of the race meeting and the particular
state, stewards' salaries range from a low of $150 per day to a
o See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 8, para. 37-9(i) (1987).
31 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4:147(2) (West 1987).
32 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 19442 (West 1974 & Supp. 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
5:5-37 (West 1973 & Supp. 1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 3A, § 203.4 (West Supp. 1989).
11 N.Y. RACiNa, PARI-MUTUEL WAGERING & BREDINo LAW § 212 (McKinney 1984).
-4 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 240.16.
35 LAC 11-6.5, 5.6.
16 Sider v. Louisiana State Racing Comm'n, 451 So. 2d 1265, 1266 (La. Ct. App.
1984); see also Romero v. Stephens, 359 So. 2d 1061, 1065 (La. Ct. App. 1978).
37 Cf. Heavner v. Illinois Racing Bd., 432 N.E.2d 290 (Ill. App. 1982).
[VOL. 78
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
high of over $400 per day in California.3 8 The qualifications of
stewards are generally not set forth by statute39 although disquali-
fications generally are. 4° As racing commissions are politically ap-
pointed and stewards positions and both visible and well-paid, these
jobs are occasionally political footballs. 41 However, several industry
groups42 and at least two universities43 are working hard to upgrade
the quality of racing officials at all levels. As a result, most
stewards are appointed on the basis of merit and expertise and
these jobs are not merely patronage plums. As might be expected,
stewards are generally drawn from the ranks of former racing
officials, jockeys, trainers, or trainer-drivers. Only a few stewards
have law degrees.
The extent of the power of the stewards to suspend licenses
and impose civil penalties is usually limited and varies according
to state law and administrative regulation. Thus, the steward's
authority to impose a civil penalty may be limited: $200 (Louis-
iana); $500 (Arizona, Maryland, and Minnesota); $1,000 (Ken-
tucky); $2,000 (California and Wisconsin); or $5,000 (Illinois,
Missouri, and New York). 44 The stewards' authority to suspend a
license also varies: thirty days in Minnesota; sixty days in Arizona,
Florida, New York, and Ohio; the balance of the race meeting
plus ten days in Louisiana or plus thirty days in Washington or
plus ninety days in Wisconsin; and unlimited authority exists in
Illinois, Kentucky, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.45 If the stewards
believe that discipline in excess of their authority is warranted or
if the rules so require, they refer cases to the racing commission
for additional consideration. Generally, the power to grant or
"ARCI, supra note 7 (unpublished survey).
" But see OsaA. STAT. ANN. tit. 3A, § 203.5(A), which requires oral examinations,
and § 203.5(B)(4), which requires experience in the racing industry.
40 E.g., OKTIA. STAT. AM. tit. 3A, §§ 202, 203.5(B)(5) (West Supp. 1989). Stewards
and their families (spouse and dependent children) may not have a financial interest in a
racing association, in a business that does business with a racing association, or in a
racehorse participating at a meeting supervised by the commission.
41 See Stokes v. Lecce, 384 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
4 The Association of Racing Commissioners, International; the United States Trotting
Association; the North American Judges and Stewards Association; and Oak Tree Racing
Association.
41 The University of Arizona, Race Track Industry Program and the University of
Louisville, Equine Administration Program.
"Survey, 53 NASRC. Bulletin 40, at V.
" See infra notes 47-95 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 562.04(1)
(West Supp. 1989); LA. REv. STAT. AM. § 4:172. The remainder of the information was
taken from Survey, supra note 44.
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revoke licenses is reserved by statute to the commission and, on
these issues, the stewards merely make recommendations. 46
B. Due Process by Stewards
How much, if any, due process is owed a licensee by stewards
is subject to much dispute. A detailed state-by-state analysis of the
issue is outside the scope of this Article. Perhaps it is sufficient to
note two overriding principles. First, due process is a flexible
concept 47 and we must determine what process is due from admin-
istrative agencies on a case-by-case basis. 41 Second, in most states,
one cannot easily determine whether the "contested case" provi-
sions of state administrative procedure acts apply to a determina-
tion by the stewards. 49 This lack of clarity causes confusion for the
practitioner and should precipitate much litigation in this area in
years to come.
Generally, cases dealing with due process before the board of
stewards have focused on the issue of summary suspension50 and
not on the nature of the stewards' hearing. Nonetheless, Baker v.
Illinois Racing Board5' held that a licensee received sufficient notice
of a stewards' hearing when the written notice set forth the rules
allegedly violated and the possible consequences of the hearing,
16 See, e.g., Costanzo v. New Jersey Racing Comm'n, 313 A.2d 618, 619 (N.J.A.D.
1974) (commission had no statutory authority to delegate to stewards the power to revoke
a license).
47 Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
4I Id. at 335 (defines a balancing test considering the private and public interests at
stake as well as the risk of erroneous deprivation of the private interest in a given admin-
istrative context); see also the debate between the majority and the concurring opinion in
Barry v. Barchi, 435 U.S. 55 (1979); Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. Rv.
1267 (1975).
41 Sider, 451 So. 2d at 1267 (holds that the contested case provisions of the Louisiana
Administrative Procedure Act do not apply to proceedings at the stewards' level and that
the trainers' due process rights were protected by the prompt hearing by the commission
and the opportunity for a subsequent appeal). But cf. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 562.04(1)(b) (West
Supp. 1989) (notice, opportunity to be heard, to present evidence, and to be represented
required at stewards' level, but stewards' meeting is not a "contested case" under the
applicable Wisconsin statutes).
"o See infra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
51 427 N.E.2d 959 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981). The Pennsylvania Harness Racing Commission
has a rule requiring stewards to give written notice of the infraction for which a person is
charged and the time and place of the hearing. See 58 PA. CODE § 183.481, cited in Frizalone
v. State Harness Racing Comm'n, 533 A.2d 288 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987). Illinois has no
rule governing stewards' hearings and some stewards currently take the position that written




even though the notice did not detail the precise nature of the
alleged infractions. Surprisingly, the assistance of counsel may even
be an issue at a stewards' hearing.52
The actions of the stewards at a race meeting represent the first
step in the process to final adjudication. A license that is suspended
by a stewards' ruling remains suspended pending a hearing before
the racing commission. If no request for a hearing before the
commission is filed timely, the license remains suspended as pro-
vided by the ruling.-3 Thus, the stewards' adjudication is often the
only and final adjudication in the matter.
III. How CASES ORIGINATE BEFORE COMMISSIONS
The procedures for bringing matters before racing commissions
for adjudication and decision are generally less formal than for
filing actions in court. Matters usually originate before commis-
sions in one of the following five ways:
1. Application filed by a racing association for the issuance of
a license to run a race meeting and an allocation of racing dates;54
2. Request filed with the commission for a hearing with respect
to a steward's ruling that recommends denial of an application for
a racing occupation license, suspends an existing license and/or
imposes a civil penalty, excludes a licensee as an undesirable from
all tracks in the state, or orders a purse redistribution; 55
3. Stewards' referral to the commission of an alleged racing
violation where there is no request for hearing (or appeal) filed
with the commission from the stewards' ruling;5 6
52 Berry v. Michigan Racing Comm'r, 321 N.W.2d 880, 885 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982)
(due process not denied when stewards told lawyer he could be present but could not
participate because licensee was entitled to subsequent de novo hearing).
53 See, e.g., ILL. AwN. STAT. ch. 8, para. 37-16(b).
-1 Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Ass'n v. State Racing Comm'n, 184
N.E.2d 38 (Mass. 1962); National Jockey Club v. Illinois Racing Comm'n, 5 N.E.2d 224
(Ill. 1936); Maywood Park Trotting Ass'n, Inc. v. Illinois Harness Racing Comm'n, 155
N.E.2d 626 (Il. 1959).
5 Famiglietti v. Pennsylvania State Horse Racing Comm'n, 388 A.2d 752 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1978) (stewards forwarded application for trainer's license, without action, to commis-
sion, which improperly denied license without proper hearing). In Ray v. Illinois Racing
Bd., 447 N.E.2d 886 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) the Illinois board imposed a civil penalty of $6,000
along with a 270 day suspension although stewards imposed only a suspension. Hearings
before the racing commissions, on request, are proceedings de novo, which means the matter
is tried anew before the commission as though the stewards never held an inquiry or hearing.
In a few states, an aggrieved party can appeal from a steward's ruling to the commission.
The commission then makes a decision based upon its review of the record made before
the board of stewards.
m Mabry v. Louisiana State Racing Comm'n, 469 So. 2d 1130 (La. Ct. App. 1985)
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4. Request for hearing filed by an occupation licensee, and in
some states a patron, who has been excluded from a race track by
that track's management; 57
5. Direct action taken by commission through a procedural
device, such as a petition for order to show cause or for issuance
of notice of hearing to review stewards' ruling, that provides proper
notice to the alleged offender of the nature of the alleged violation
and the right to be present and represented at the hearing.5 8
These five avenues for bringing cases before racing commissions
can intertwine. Thus, in Olbrych v. Louisiana Racing Commis-
sion, 9 a trainer was suspended by the stewards after his horse
tested positive for prohibited drugs. The trainer did not appeal the
ruling but the stewards on their own volition referred the violation
to the commission, which after notice and hearing entered its
decision affirming the stewards' ruling.
Unlike the practice in Louisiana, the stewards in Illinois do not
formally refer violations to the Illinois Racing Board ("IRB"). The
IRB treats possession of a goading device as a serious violation
warranting a lifetime suspension and the IRB's orders in this regard
have been upheld by the courts 0 When a groom named Coleman
received a two-year suspension by the stewards for possession of a
goading device, neither the stewards nor IRB staff did anything to
bring the matter to the IRB's attention. Coleman did not request
a hearing before the IRB but instead pled guilty to a felony charge
and received an eighteen-month probated sentence. 61
(stewards fined trainer the maximum amount within their power and then referred matter
to racing commission with recommendation for additional fine); Olbrych v. Louisiana State
Racing Comm'n, 451 So. 2d 1253, 1256 (La. Ct. App. 1984); Hanson v. Louisiana State
Racing Comm'n, 436 So. 2d 1308 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
17 Phillips v. Graham, 427 N.E.2d 550 (Ill. 1981) (trainer excluded from race track
after being indicted for bribery). Patron exclusions generally are not reviewable either by
the racing commission or the courts unless authorized by statute. See, e.g., Rockwell v.
Pennsylvania State Horse Racing Comm'n, 327 A.2d 211 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1974); Epstein
v. California Horse Racing Bd., 35 Cal.Rptr. 642 (1963). On the subject of exclusions
generally, see Kropp, Landen & Donath, Exclusions of Patrons and Horsemen from Race
Tracks: A Legal, Practical and Constitutional Dilemma, 74 Ky. L.J. 739 (1985-86); and
Klein & Klein, A Legal Survey of Race Track Exclusions: 1974-1984, monograph published
by Harness Tracks of America, 1984 [hereinafter HTA monograph].
38 Belvllle v. Illinois Racing Bd., 473 N.E.2d 500 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (jockey suspended
for life upon board staff's filing of petition for order to show cause, after stewards had
exonerated the jockey); Levinson v. Washington Horse Racing Comm'n, 740 P.2d 898
(Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (commission issued notice of hearing to review board of stewards'
ruling). But see Ballard v. Wyoming Pari-Mutuel Comm'n, 750 P.2d 286, 288 (Wyo. 1988).
11 451 So. 2d 1253 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
60 See infra note 249 and accompanying text.
61 Coleman v. Illinois Racing Board, 529 N.E.2d 520 (I1. 1988).
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At the end of the two-year suspension, Coleman applied to
have his groom's license reinstated. The IRB rejected the applica-
tion and entered an order that permanently barred him from racing.
Upon appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court in Coleman v. Illinois
Racing Board2 viewed the matter as an attempt by the IRB to
correct a disciplinary action by its stewards that the IRB, upon
later consideration, found to be too lenient. The IRB, therefore,
was ordered to reinstate the groom's license.
Given the industry's interest in the prompt and efficient ad-
ministration of discipline, the time frame for an appeal of a ste-
ward's decision to the commission is often as short as two or three
days.63 Usually, an appeal or request for hearing can be filed merely
by lodging a request for hearing at the commission office. How-
ever, in some states, commission rules require that the request for
hearing be accompanied by an appeal bond. The constitutionality
of such a bond requirement was challenged but not decided in
recent Louisiana cases. 4 On the other hand, a 1975 New York
decision invalidated a rule requiring an appeal bond as being in
excess of the statute and a violation of due process.6 5
The practitioner is cautioned to read both the enabling statute
and the commission's rules to gain a full appreciation of what may
be appealed and how appeals are made. The general rule is that
all stewards' decisions may be appealed except their decision to
make a race official for the purpose of payment of winning pari-
mutuel ticket-holders. 66 In Kentucky, a stewards' decision regarding
the finish of a race may not be challenged.67 Further, there may
be prerequisites to an appeal to the commission of a stewards'
decision regarding the finish of a race, such as lodging a protest
with the stewards before winning wagers are paid.68In McKenna v. Pennsylvania State Horse Racing Commission,69
a letter was mailed by the Commission to an owner of race track
stock ordering him to divest himself of the stock and advising him
Q Id.
0 Omo ADMIN. CODE 3769-17-41 (1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. 5:5-52 (West 1973 & Supp.
1988).
Hall v. Louisiana State Racing Comm'n, 505 So. 2d 744 (La. Ct. App. 1987);
Barkley v. Louisiana State Racing Comm'n, 506 So. 2d 580 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
6 MacRae v. New York State Racing & Wagering Bd., 368 N.Y.S.2d 313 (A.D. 1975).
6See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 19440 (West 1974 & Supp. 1989).
67 KENTUCKY RuLEs OF RACING, R.IV, § 4.
" Pinsley v. New York State Racing & Wagering Bd., 428 N.Y.S.2d 527 (A.D. 1980).
476 A.2d 505 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984).
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that he had ten days to request a hearing or the order would
become final.70 McKenna did not request a hearing but the matter
was twice continued. Thereafter, the commission sent another no-
tice of a hearing to be held in eight days. Service of this notice
was received by McKenna the day before the hearing. Without
indicating whether McKenna ever received the first letter, or notice
of the continuances, or whether he appeared at the hearing, the
court held that he received adequate notice in the first letter and
that, having failed to request a hearing, had waived his rights .7
IV. NATURE AND CONDUCT OF COMMfSS1oN HEARINGS
A. In General
All state racing commissions function as civil administrative
bodies. 72 Hearings before the commissions, therefore, are not com-
parable to criminal trials.73 Racing commissions lack the authority
to charge any person with the commission of a crime of any sort.
Unlike a criminal trial, all relevant evidence is admissible at a
commission hearing, as the goals of a criminal trial differ from
the goals of a civil proceeding. The essential goal of a criminal
trial is penal while a disciplinary hearing before a racing commis-
sion is regulatory. 74
Due to the civil nature of the proceedings before a racing
commission, relevant evidence that would be excluded in a criminal
prosecution can be considered by the commission. 75 For example,
the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld a decision by the New Jersey
Racing Commission based upon evidence improperly obtained by
the state police in an illegal entrapment scheme.76 Also, in Arkansas
State Racing Commission v. Sayler,77 the Arkansas commission
suspended a jockey indefinitely for possession of a battery but
70 Id. at 508.
71 Id.
72 Arrington v. Louisiana State Racing Comm'n, 482 So. 2d 200, 201 (La. Ct. App.
1986).
71 Giles v. Washington Horse Racing Comm'n, 771 P.2d 1159, 1162 (Wash. Ct. App.
1989); Mabry v. Louisiana State Racing Comm'n, 169 So. 2d 1130, 1132 (La. Ct. App.
1985); Taylor v. Hazel Park Racing Ass'n, 371 N.W.2d 447, 450 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).
74 Delguidice v. New Jersey Racing Comm'n, 494 A.2d 1007, 1009 (N.J. 1985).
17 Pullin v. Louisiana State Racing Comm'n, 477 So. 2d 683, 687 (La. 1985).
76 Delguidice, 494 A.2d at 1009.
- 462 S.W.2d 472, 474 (Ark. 1971).
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stated in the order that the jockey would be reinstated if he
produced a satisfactory polygraph test concerning the incident.
Neither the results of a polygraph test nor evidence obtained by
entrapment may be admitted in criminal trials.78
Hearings before racing commissions are often referred to as
"appeals" from the stewards. Actually, the proceeding in most
states is a hearing de novo. If the proceeding is technically an
appeal, the commission will hear no new evidence but instead will
make its decision solely upon the record made before the stewards.
On the other hand, a hearing de novo is a new adversarial pro-
ceeding that is not dependent upon or limited by the prior stewards'
inquiry or hearing.79
At a hearing upon request by the licensee, the racing commis-
sion is not bound by the length of suspension or civil penalty
imposed by the stewards.80 The commission's decision may impose
greater or lesser penalties than those imposed by the stewards,
although often the commissions' decisions conform to the stewards'
rulings with respect to the severity of the penalty.8' For this reason,
practitioners before racing commissions are sometimes reluctant to
request a hearing before the racing commission unless they are
convinced that the stewards' ruling is incorrect as a matter of law
or that the evidence in their case is strong.
Prior to 1986, the Wyoming racing statute and rules of the
Wyoming Pari-Mutuel Commission did not allow the commission
to increase the period of suspension imposed by the stewards.8 2
This prohibition was changed by legislation effective March 20,
1986.83 In 1985, the Wyoming Pari-Mutuel Commission increased
71 Given the controversial nature of polygraph tests, the authors do not suggest that
polygraph test results are or should be admissible evidence before state racing commissions
generally.
79 Ray v. Illinois Racing Bd., 447 N.E.2d 886 (Ill. App. Ct. App. 1983).
- Id.; Hacker v. Pennsylvania Horse Racing Comm'n, 405 A.2d 1379 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1979); Poisson v. State Harness Racing Comm'n, 287 A.2d 852 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1972); Pence v. Idaho State Horse Racing Comm'n, 705 P.2d 1067 (Idaho App. Ct. 1985);
cf. Ballard v. Wyoming Pari-Mutuel Comm'n, 750 P.2d 286 (Wyo. 1988) (rule at time of
suspension did not allow commission to increase period of suspension ordered by stewards).
11 See, e.g., Edwards v. Illinois Racing Bd., 543 N.E.2d 172 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)
(board reduced stewards' life suspension to nine months for each of fourteen violations for
failure to guard); Sanders v. Michigan Racing Comm'n, 390 N.W.2d 206 (Mich. Ct. App.
1986); Belanger v. New York State Racing & Wagering Bd., 494 N.Y.S.2d 451 (App. Div.
1985) (board confirmed suspension imposed by stewards after it was sustained by hearing
officer).
1 Wyo. STAT. § 11-25-104(c) (1977); WYOMING RuiFs oF RAcING & P.As-MUTTBL
EvENTs ch. 1, § 3(1).
11 1986 Wyo. Sass. LAWS ch. 117; Wyo. STAT. § 11-25-104(j) (1987 Cum. Supp).
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the one and one-half month suspension of a trainer to two years
and increased the civil penalty as imposed by the stewards, from
$100 to $1500. The violation resulted from the finding of predni-
solone (a steroid) in a urine sample taken from the trainer's horse.
The Wyoming Supreme Court held that the commission had no
authority to increase the suspension from what had been imposed
by the stewards and that the 1986 legislative change was not ret-
roactive. 84
In some states, the adjudication process before the commission
is bifurcated, with the hearing and decisional phases being handled
separately. For example, in some states, afi administrative law
judge or hearing examiner conducts the hearing and prepares a
report for the commission, which then reviews the report, the
transcript of testimony, and the exhibits and then renders a deci-
sion. 85 Although the adjudication process is bifurcated, the case
remains a proceeding de novo.
In California, where the commission hearing is de novo, and
in Oklahoma, where the commission hearing is a review of the
record made by the stewards, the power of the commission to
overrule the stewards is limited. The California Horse Racing Board
and the Oklahoma Horse Racing Commission may overrule a
stewards' decision if a preponderance of evidence indicates:
(a) the stewards mistakenly interpreted the law; or
(b) new evidence of a convincing nature is produced; or
(c) the best interests of racing and the state may be better
served.86
A racing commission also may reject its own administrative
law judge's report and issue its own findings based on the record
before the administrative law judge.87 The administrative law judge,
unlike a steward, serves as the hearing officer in the de novo
proceeding before the commission, which is responsible for the
final decision by the administrative agency. Where the commission
differs from its administrative law judge's report and recommen-
Ballard, 750 P.2d 286.
85 See DeVitis v. New Jersey Racing Commn'n, 495 A 2d 457, 460 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1985); Carruthers v. Board of Horse Racing, 700 P.2d 179, 181 (Mont. 1985);
Solimena v. Dep't of Bus. Reg., 402 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), rev. denied,
412 So. 2d 470.
" CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 19440 (West 1974 & Supp. 1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 3A, § 204(B)(2).
" DeVitis, 495 A.2d at 461; Carruthers, 700 P.2d at 181.
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dations, the commission ordinarily must demonstrate it gave ap-
propriate consideration to the report and recommendations and
must clearly state its areas of disagreement. 8
The bifurcation is supposed to reduce some of the possibilities
of bias in the quasi-judicial proceedings before the racing commis-
sions, which by statute entail a merger of investigatory, prosecu-
torial, and adjudicatory functions. However, many of the cases
before racing commissions turn upon credibility of the witnesses. 89
The commissioners are responsible for making the final decision
for the commission, but the bifurcation prevents the commissioners
from personally observing the demeanor of the witnesses. Even
though the career of a jockey or a trainer is at stake, the reviewing
courts leave the assessment of the credibility of the witnesses to a
racing commission that typically has no means of directly observing
the witnesses' demeanor.
The racing industry is highly competitive and is, by necessity,
subjected to close scrutiny and strict regulation. Commission de-
cisions sometimes appear tough and overly harsh to those in the
industry. As an example, the Michigan Racing Commissioner (Mi-
chigan has a one-member commission) ordered a redistribution of
the winner's purse and fined the trainer where a post-race urinalysis
revealed the presence of dimethyl sulfoxide (DMSO) in a horse on
race day. This disciplinary action was taken even though the tes-
timony before the commissioner disclosed that DMSO had been
used as a leg paint at race tracks for thirty to forty years and that
the trainer's veterinarian had been told by the state's veterinarian
at the track that topical use of DMSO was permissible. 9°
Strict regulation was also exemplified by the Rhode Island
Racing and Athletics Hearing Board's suspension of a trainer whose
mare tested positive for vitamin B-1. The trainer's witnesses at-
tempted to show that vitamin B-1 is a food for horses as well as
human beings. The commission, however, relied upon the testi-
mony of the state's toxicologist, who was of the opinion that
vitamin B-1 is a drug.91
0 DeVitis, 495 A.2d at 461-62.
99 See, e.g., Sayler, 462 S.W.2d 472 (Ark. 1971); Bellville v. Illinois Racing Bd., 473
N.E.2d 500 (ill. App. Ct. 1984); Feliciano v. Illinois Racing Board, 443 N.E.2d 261 (il.
App. Ct. 1982). For standards governing the separation between prosecutorial and judicial
functions in an administrative agency, see Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975); Wilkey
v. Illinois Racing Bd., 449 N.E.2d 843 (Ill. 1983); Famiglietti v. Pennsylvania State Horse
Racing Comm'n, 388 A.2d 752 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978).
Sanders, 390 N.W.2d 206 (court affirmed the racing commissioner's decision).
, Brown v. Waldman, 177 A.2d 179 (R.I. 1962) (board decision upheld on appeal).
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The failure of a horseman to conform to a commission's pro-
cedural niceties may sometimes result in what industry members
perceive to be an injustice. For example, a protest against the result
of a race ordinarily must be made before winnings are paid.
However, in Pinsley v. New York State Racing & Wagering Board,92
the aggrieved horseman resorted to an appeal rather than a protest
and, as a result, the New York Board refused to award the horse-
man the first place purse money because he had used an incorrect
procedure. The Board's decision was affirmed on appeal. 93
B. Quorum
Generally, a majority of a racing commission constitutes a
quorum and a majority of the quorum may act for the commission.
If one or more members of the commission recuse themselves from
the proceeding, a legal question may arise as to whether the dis-
qualified members who are physically present should be counted
in determining whether a quorum is present.
In King v. New Jersey Racing Commission,94 the stewards
suspended a harness driver for six months because he allegedly
drove with the intent of losing. The administrative law judge, after
hearing the case for the commission, concluded that the driver's
license should not be suspended unless the commission modified
its interim decision within forty-five days.
At the commission meeting to review the interim decision, the
chairman, upon the request of the driver, recused himself from the
proceeding but remained physically present. Another member of
the then four-member commission was absent. The remaining two
members made the final decision reversing the interim decision and
reinstating the six months suspension. Upon appeal, the court ruled
that the interim decision of no violation was deemed adopted by
the commission because there was no quorum at the time the
commission attempted to take action and no further action was
taken within the forty-five day period. 95
-2 428 N.Y.S.2d 527 (A.D. 1980).
93 Id.
501 A.2d 173 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985).
11 Id. Under an attorney general's opinion in Illinois, a board member who is dis-
qualified in a proceeding but remains physically present is counted in order to make a




An application for a racing license and an allocation of dates
is considered to be an adjudicatory proceeding involving the legal
privileges of the applicants that must be determined after oppor-
tunity for a commission hearing. 6 The decision following the hear-
ing must set forth a statement of the reasons for the particular
dates allotted and include subsidiary findings of fact to support
the allocation. The absence of express findings makes the decision
questionable.9
The broad standards or factors to be applied by the commis-
sions in allocating dates are set forth in the various state racing
statutes.18 These factors are particularly pertinent where two or
more applicants seek to race in the same geographical area on the
same dates and the same hours or the combined number of days
sought by the applicants exceeds the limited number of racing days
allowed by statute. Other factors considered are the financial in-
tegrity of the applicants, prospective revenues to the state, and the
adequacy and suitability of the track facilities.9
Hearings concerning the allocation of racing dates, at least in
some states, are not typical administrative hearings in that the
participation of the applicants or their counsel is restricted to the
answering of questions raised by the commission. This procedure
has been held not to violate due process requirements because the
commission, which must both investigate and decide, is not held
to the standard of objectivity of a judicial tribunal.00
Testimony at dates allocation hearings is heard from the various
applicants, other representatives of the horse racing industry, and
the public generally. The voluminous record consists primarily of
exhibits and testimony concerning the past and projected perform-
ances of the applicants in regard to state revenues generated, their
financial integrity, the caliber of their management, and the suit-
ability of the various racing facilities.101
96 Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Asssn v. State Racing Comm'n, 175
N.E.2d 244, 249 (Mass. 1961); Maywood Park Trotting Ass'n, Inc. v. Illinois Harness
Racing Comm'n, 155 N.E.2d 626, 628 (Ill. 1959).
9Id.; see infra notes 230-41 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., 3A OKxA. STAT. ANN. § 205.2.
" Id. The fact that a racing organization has previously held a license and acted
properly is also a factor that is sometimes considered. Bay State Harness Ass'n, 175 N.E.2d
244 (IlL. 1961).
11 Gillilan v. Illinois Racing Bd., 411 N.E.2d 1374, 1379 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
101 People ex rel. Scott v. Illinois Racing Board; 301 N.E.2d 285 (Ill. 1973).
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Despite these broad statutory standards, racing commissions do
not have arbitrary and unbridled discretion in the allocation of
dates. For example, in People ex. reL Scott v. Illinois Racing
Board,'0 the Illinois Supreme Court, upon an appeal by the Illinois
Attorney General, reversed the 1973 dates allocation to Balmoral
Jockey Club and Balmoral Park Trot because the record at the
dates hearing established that a stockholder in these racing organ-
izations was then under indictment. Still, appeals from commis-
sions' dates orders usually become moot because the dates as
awarded have passed by the time a court reaches its decision.' 0 3
D. Right-Privilege Distinction
Despite some earlier precedents concerning the right-privilege
distinction as applied to an occupational license,'04 most courts
now hold that a license to pursue an occupation such as jockey or
horse trainer is a property interest protected by the due process
provisions of the state and federal constitutions.0 5 The right versus
privilege analysis, which once governed the applicability of proce-
dural due process, lost its vitality when rejected by the U.S. Su-
preme Court in Barry v. Barchi.'0 This case reversed a summary
suspension of a trainer for an alleged medication violation because
a prompt post-suspension hearing was not held before the com-
mission.0 7 It is doubtful that a commission can now validly deny
the renewal of an occupational license without notice and hear-
ing.108
102 Id.
103 Maywood Park Trotting Ass'n, Inc. v. Illinois Harness Racing Comm'n, 155 N.E.2d
626 (Ill. 1959).
104 Solimena, 402 So. 2d at 1246; State Racing Comm'n v. McManus, 476 P.2d 767
(N.M. 1970); Sanderson v. New Mexico Racing Comm'n, 453 P.2d 370 (N.M. 1969); State
ex rel. Morris v. West Virginia Racing Comm'n, 55 S.E.2d 263, 270 (W.Va. 1949).
10 Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979); DeVitis, 495 A.2d at 462; Phillips v. Graham,
427 N.E.2d 550, 555 (Il1. 1981); Olbrych v. Louisiana State Racing Comm'n, 451 So. 2d
1253, 1257 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
-- 443 U.S. 55 (1979). For cases upholding summary suspensions over due process
objections, see Hubel v. West Virginia Racing Comm'n, 513 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1975);
O'Daniel v. Ohio State Racing Comm'n, 307 N.E.2d 529 (Ohio 1974); McManus, 476 P.2d
at 772 ("Ihe seven day suspension here might be more comparable to the ruling of an
umpire or a referee."); Marohn v. Van Lindt, 473. N.Y.Supp.2d 560 (A.D. 1984). In
Simmons v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 407 So. 2d 269, 270 n.3 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1981), aff'd, 412 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 1982), the court declared the privilege versus right
analysis to be outdated.
M Barry, 443 U.S. 55.
M00 See, e.g., Archilla v. Insular Racing Commission, 72 P.R.R. 397 (1951); ILL. REv.
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In Durham v. Louisiana State Racing Commission,109 the 1983-
84 trainer license of Fay Durham was suspended because her hus-
band's license as a trainer had been suspended. Upon appeal, the
Louisiana Supreme Court ordered that her license be reinstated.
Her application for the following year, however, was denied by
the commission without notice or hearing because her husband was
still suspended. Upon appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court 10 up-
held the commission's denial without notice or hearing on the
ground that Ms. Durham held no license for 1984-85 and, there-
fore, had no protected property interest entitled to due process.
The distinction between suspension of the license and renewal of
a license for due process purposes seems somewhat tenuous.
The New Mexico Supreme Court in 1969 strongly relied upon
the right-privilege distinction to uphold both a rule imposing strict
liability as a condition for a horse owner's license and a rule
requiring the person in charge of the horse to guard against the
administration of drugs."' However, in State Racing Commission
v. McManus,"2 the same court ruled that a jockey's right as a
citizen to engage in his chosen profession entitles him to due
process protection, even though his jockey's license created no
vested right to due process.
In 1960, the Kentucky General Assembly adopted a legislative
determination that participation in horse racing, at least in Ken-
tucky, is a privilege and not a personal right.13 This legislative
declaration of state policy concerning the right-privilege distinction,
however, should not defeat a licensee's rights in Kentucky to
procedural due process under the fourteenth amendment.
E. Constitutional Challenge
Many cases that come before state racing commissions involve
challenges to the constitutionality of commission rules or provisions
STAT. ch. 127, para. 1016(c) (1987). But see Saumell v. Van Lindt, 481 N.Y.S.2d 759, 760
(A.D. 1984), where the court held that "the New York State Racing and Wagering Board
may, in the exercise of their discretion, choose to conduct a hearing on the question of the
renewal of plaintiff's license as a jockey." See also Durham v. Louisiana State Racing
Comm'n, 458 So. 2d 1292 (La. 1985).
109 449 So. 2d 475 (La. 1984).
110 Durham, 458 So. 2d 1292.
" Sanderson, 453 P.2d 370.
112 476 P.2d 767, 771 (N.M. 1970).
11 K.R.S. § 230.215(1), (2).
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of the racing statute." 4 Constitutional questions ordinarily should
be raised at the first opportunity in order to avoid waiver of the
issue. However, a racing commission, like other state agencies, is
usually powerless to decide the constitutionality of either its own
rules or the state racing statute.15
Lawyers who practice before racing commissions face the fur-
ther hurdle that any statute or regulation exercising police power
is presumed to be constitutional and that a reasonable doubt as to
its constitutionality must be resolved in favor of the law's valid-
ity." 6 In general, however, these challenges have not been widely
successful if the regulation in question is perceived to be directly
related to the integrity of racing and gambling and, thus, within
the state's police power." 7
The limitations imposed on agency authority applicable to other
state boards and commissions are not often interpreted by the
courts as applying to racing commissions. The judicial rationale
was perhaps best expressed by the Florida Supreme Court in Hi-
aleah Racing Course, Inc. v. Gulfstream Racing Association:"8
The state has become peculiarly interested in racing because of
the revenues from the pari-mutuel betting. Authorized gambling
is a matter over which the state may exercise greater control and
exercise its police power in a more arbitrary manner because of
the noxious qualities of the enterprise as distinguished from the
enterprises not affected with the public interest and those enter-
prises over which the exercise of the police power is not so
essential for the public welfare." 9
F. Warrantless Searches
Horse racing is usually considered to fall under the pervasive
system of regulation exception to the administrative search require-
"4 See, e.g., Phillips, 427 N.E.2d 550; Hansen v. Illinois Racing Bd., 534 N.E.2d 658
(Ill. App. Ct. 1984); Durham, 449 So. 2d 475; Gregg v. Oregon Racing Comm'n, 588 P.2d
1290 (Or. Ct. App. 1978).
"I Solimena, 402 So. 2d at 1245.
116 Tweel v. West Virginia Racing Comm'n, 76 S.E.2d 874, 884 (W.Va. 1953); Fiora-
vanti v. State Racing Comm'n, 375 N.E.2d 722, 726 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978).
"7 Sandstrom v. California Horse Racing Bd., 189 P.2d 17, 21 (Cal. 1948), cert.
denied, 335 U.S. 814 (1948); Commonwealth v. Webb, 274 A.2d 261, 267 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1971).




ment. Warrantless searches at race tracks were upheld in Lanchester
v. Pennsylvania State Horse Racing Commission,120 State v. Dolce,"-2
Federman v. Department of Business Regulation,-22 and People v.
Strauss. 1 " However, the Illinois rule on warrantless searches was
held invalid with respect to searches of on-track dormitory rooms
because the racing statute fails to allow for warrantless searches of
residences and, therefore, the rule did not properly limit the dis-
cretion of the inspecting officers.- 24
G. Vagueness
Lawyers unfamiliar with racing find the terms used in racing
quite vague and somewhat incomprehensible. Although lawyers
understand precisely such concepts as due process and the hypo-
thetical reasonable man, they sometimes have trouble with such
terms as "conduct detrimental to the best interests of racing,"
"injurious to the character of the turf," or "call into question the
honesty and integrity of the sport."'- Lawyers unfamiliar with
these terms are inclined, when representing a client before a racing
commission, to attack these and other such phrases as being un-
constitutionally vague. The vagueness doctrine applies primarily to
criminal prosecutions that are penal in nature rather than regula-
tory. The standards applied to a law or regulation that imposes no
criminal sanctions are somewhat less rigorous."26
In Pennsylvania, the courts have ruled that racing rules are not
defective for vagueness if a person of ordinary intelligence is ca-
pable of determining what conduct the rule covers. 27 Thus, disci-
plinary action against a jockey whose presence was considered
1 325 A.2d 648, 653 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1974).
121 428 A.2d 947, 952 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981).
2 414 So. 2d 28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
M 502 N.E.2d 1287 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
,14 Serpas v. Schmidt, 827 F.2d 23, 30 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 904
(1988); Hansen, 534 N.E.2d 658 (Illinois rule held to violate fourth amendment with respect
to search of trainer's vehicle on track grounds). In Euster v. Pennsylvania State Horse
Racing Comm'n, 431 F. Supp. 828 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (civil rights action alleging that
commission employee had directed a warrantless search of plaintiff's barn area dismissed
for lack of required specificity).
' These phrases appear in numerous statutes and commission regulations, e.g., ILL.
Rnv. STAT. ch. 8, para. 37-9(e) (1989).
126 Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 230 (1951).
2 Pennsylvania State Harness Racing Comm'n v. Dancer, 33 A.2d 196, 198 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1975); Pennsylvania State Horse Racing Comm'n v. DiSanto, 372 A.2d 487,
490 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977).
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"detrimental to the best interests of racing" was upheld. 2 1 Courts
have generally sustained commissions' disciplinary action against
claims of vagueness. 129
H. Statutory Authority
Judicial review of the statutory authority for a commission's
actions or rules is always an appropriate concern. Thus, some
racing statutes have been found not to be reasonably related to the
purposes of the act and some regulations have been held to be
beyond the commission's authority. For example, even though The
Jockey Club is the breed registry for thoroughbred racehorses,
New York's highest court invalidated a commission rule delegating
the licensing power to The Jockey Club. 130 Similarly, although the
United States Trotting Association (U.S.T.A.) is the breed registry
for standardbred racehorses, a rule making membership in the
U.S.T.A. a prerequisite to licensure has also been invalidated as
exceeding the commission's authority.13 1
A statute prohibiting the use of "any substance foreign to the
natural horse or dog" was found not "to bear a fair and substantial
relationship to the objectives' ' 32 contained in the articulated rea-
sons for the Florida racing law. The court reasoned that the statute
prohibited "everything, the helpful and harmful, the beneficial and
the detrimental, the benign and the deleterious."' 3 3 However, con-
fronted with a comparable statute, a Michigan appellate court
found that the Michigan Racing Commissioner had the statutory
authority to penalize trainers whose horses tested positive for phe-
nothiazine, a worming agent that would not affect the racing
condition of a horse, and methanine, a urinary tract disinfectant. 34
"I Daly v. Pennsylvania Horse Racing Comm'n, 391 A.2d 1134 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1978).
'- Gillilan, 411 N.E.2d at 1377 (Statutory term "financial integrity" as a standard for
granting a license to a race track operator is not unconstitutionally vague.); Pence, 705
P.2d at 1070 (Term "misconduct" is not unconstitutionally vague.).
130 Fink v. Cole, 97 N.E.2d 873, 876 (N.Y. 1951).
"I Costanza v. New Jersey Racing Comm'n, 313 A.2d 618, 620 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1974).
1,2 Simmons, 407 So. 2d at 272.
"3 Id. at 271. In affirming the Appellate Court's decision, the Supreme Court of
Florida "adopt[ed] the reasoning expressed" in the Appellate Court's opinion. 412 So. 2d
at 359.
,34 McIllmurray v. Michigan Racing Comm'r, 343 N.W.2d 524 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
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I. Compliance with State Rule-making Requirements
State administrative procedure acts (APA's) generally contain
formal requirements for the adoption or amendment of an admin-
istrative regulation. If the state APA applies to the racing com-
mission," 5 then the commission must comply with these procedures
before enacting or amending a rule. State APA's usually require
some sort of notice and publication, with opportunity for public
input and legislative oversight, prior to enactment of a binding
rule. The method and manner of public notice varies widely de-
pending on the precise requirements of the applicable state APA.
The impact of these rule-making requirements is demonstrated in
three racing cases, two of which invalidated agency action.
In 1981, the Louisiana Racing Commission tackled a sensitive
issue and decided that a person who has a direct or indirect
financial interest in a race track should not be allowed to own or
train a horse that races at that track. A commission rule to this
effect was challenged by the owners of the Fair Grounds Corpo-
ration. 3 6 The commission had published notice of its intent to
adopt the rule in the Louisiana Register as required by that state's
APA. 37 The notice, however, stated only that the text of the rule
could be obtained by contacting the commission's office. The
notice did not contain the text of the one sentence (thirty-one
words) rule nor did the notice describe the substance of the rule.'38
The Louisiana APA required "substantial compliance" with
the Act's notice requirements prior to the enactment of a valid
rule. 139 The requirement of notice was that "either the terms or
substance of the intended action or a description of the subjects
and issues involved" be published.Y° The commission did neither.
The Louisiana appellate court found the rule void ab initio even
I's Determining whether a state APA applies to any particular state agency may not
be easy. See, e.g., Comment, Administrative Adjudications: An Overview of the Existing
Models and their Failure to Achieve Uniformity and a Proposal for a Uniform Adjudicatory
Framework, 46 Omao ST. L.J. 355, 358-60 (1985). However, reference to the state APA
may be found in the statute creating the racing commission, or the commission may be
defined as an agency within the meaning of the state APA. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch.
127, para. 1003.01 (1987); WAsH. REv. CODE. ANN. § 34.04.010(1) (West 1965 & Supp.
1989).
'-1 Dorignac v. Louisiana State Racing Commission, 436 So. 2d 667 (La. Ct. App.
1983).
I" Id. at 669.
139 Id.
139 Id.
110 Id. at 668.
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though those that challenged the rule had actual knowledge of the
rule and had participated in racing commission meetings and ar-
gued against its adoption.1 41
Failure of the racing commission to underline the text of a
proposed amendment was found to be mandatory and a fatal error
in Clark v. Washington Horse Racing Commission.142 The com-
mission had sent the agenda of a board meeting and the entire text
of a proposed amendment to all interested parties. One part of the
amendment was underlined but another portion was not.'43 Despite
the error, the amendment was accepted by the official reviewer of
agency rules and was published in the Washington State Register.44
Eighteen months after the rule was officially on the books, the
commission applied it to redistribute two purses. Three years after
that, the Washington Supreme Court in a seven to two decision
reversed the commission's decision because the amendment was not
properly adopted.' 4i
The interplay between commission action and the rule-making
provisions of the Illinois APA was also a central issue in Ogden-
Fairmount, Inc. v. Illinois Racing Board.'46 In this case, the racing
board penalized a race track for filing false documents. Despite
the fact that the documents were required by a non-rule, the Illinois
Supreme Court sustained the imposition of a $105,000 fine. 47 The
case illustrates the broad deference given racing commissions by
the courts.
A provision of the Illinois Horse Racing Act creates a Race
Track Improvement Fund (RTIF).' 48 An account is created with
the state treasurer for each racing association from fifty percent
of the breakage' 49 at each meeting. The purpose of the RTIF is
'14 Id. at 669-70.
142 720 P.2d 831 (Wash. 1986).
,41 Id. at 833-34.
144 Id. at 836 (Dore, J., dissenting).
141 The authors are duly impressed that counsel for the horse owners in Clark went
behind the published text of the rule to find an error in the rule-making procedure.
1- 518 N.E.2d 120 (Ill. 1988).
141 The authors used to believe that agencies imposed civil penalties and criminal courts
imposed fimes. The Illinois Horse Racing Act gives the board the power to impose "civil
penalties," ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 8, para. 37-9I), but since the Illinois Supreme Court used
the word "fine" in the Ogden-Fairmount decision, the distinction between a civil penalty
and a fine is apparently lost, as persistent misuse has made the words synonymous. Ogden-
Fairmount, Inc. v. Illinois Racing Bd., 518 N.E.2d 120, 124 (1II. 1987).
M ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 8, para. 37-32 (1985).
1, Breakage is defined as the "odd cents by which the amount payable on each dollar
exceeds a multiple of 10 cents." Id. at para. 37-3.02 (1987).
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"to aid tracks in improving their facilities.""15 Money from the
RTIF is distributed to the track for capital improvements, the
purchase of equipment, the amortization of debts and other spec-
ified purposes.151 The legislature mandated that the board adopt
"procedural rules and regulations governing information required,
deadlines for filing, and types of application forms to be observed
by the tracks seeking monies from the [RTIF] . ' 152
The board dutifully adopted the procedural rules but in 1979
they went a step further and adopted a "sense of the Board
resolution" that an applicant for RTIF money "had to provide at
least three competitive bids with each application seeking approval
of expenditure from the Fund. 15 3 In 1984, the racing board learned
that Ogden-Fairmount, Inc. had filed nineteen RTIF applications
containing spurious bids, not obtained by competitive bidding, but
rather obtained by a favored contractor after contracts had been
awarded to him.1 54 The applications were certified by officers of
Ogden-Fairmount as being true and correct.' 55 The board's staff
then initiated proceedings that resulted in the $105,000 fine.
Challenging the board's action, the race track was successful
at both the trial and appellate court level. The latter focused on
the three bid requirement. Since the sense of the board resolution
was not a rule adopted in compliance with the Illinois APA, the
appellate court reasoned that "all consequences that flow from a
failure to follow [the resolution] also must fail.' ' 56 The Illinois
Supreme Court, however, unanimously concluded that the validity
of the sense of the board resolution was "irrelevant to the issue
of the Board's authority to penalize Ogden-Fairmount.' '1 57 The
court relied on the board's broad authority to penalize any action
that "is a detriment or impediment to horse racing'1 58 and con-
cluded that deliberate lies in certified filings constituted threats to
the integrity of racing.' 15 9
Id. at para. 37-32(c) (1985).
"' Id. at para. 37-32(d) (1985).
1,2 Id. at para. 37-32(e) (1985).
' Ogden-Fairmount, 518 N.E.2d at 123.
" Id. at 123-124.
Id. at 123.
' Ogden-Fairmount, Inc. v. Illinois Racing Bd., 498 N.E.2d 882, 889 (II. App. Ct.
1986), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 518 N.E.2d 120 (Iln. 1987).
"7 Ogden-Fairmount, 518 N.E.2d at 125.
" ILL. R . STAT. ch. 8, para. 37-9(b) (1985).




Theoretically, administrative agencies develop expertise in spe-
cialized or technical areas and therefore dispense justice more
rapidly than the courts. Thus, there is an inherent tendency among
regulators to disdain traditional discovery such as depositions and
interrogatories as these are viewed as time consuming or dilatory.160
As a practical matter, discovery at the racing commission level
often depends as much upon the goodwill of the commission
attorney as it does upon some statutory or regulatory right to
depose witnesses, propound interrogatories, or compel the produc-
tion of documents.
The skillful practitioner confronted with an uncooperative com-
mission will, if possible, make alternative use of the state's freedom
of information act. Further, given the reputation of the New York
State Racing and Wagering Board (NYSRWB) for not permitting
discovery, 161 one may surmise that some of the federal civil rights
complaints filed against the NYSRWB are more a desperate turning
to the liberal federal discovery rules than a desire to vindicate
federally protected rights. When the federal complaint also results
in temporary injunctive relief, the counter-productive effect of the
NYSRWB's closed book policy becomes apparent.
Frequently, a racing commission investigation commences with
an anonymous tip.162 In Gregg v. Oregon Racing Commission, 6
an informant's tip prompted an investigation that led to a license
revocation hearing. The licensee argued that he was denied due
process when the commission denied him access to the 6ommission
investigator's reports of an anonymous telephone call. Since the
reports were not a part of the state's case and the licensee had the
full opportunity to cross-examine all the witnesses who testified
against him, the court rejected the argument.' 64
M In Loftin v. Louisiana State Racing Comm'n, 449 So. 2d 136 (La. Ct. App. 1984),
the trainer sought to propound interrogatories to the commission regarding possible irreg-
ularities in the drug testing procedure. The commission filed a motion to quash, which was
sustained by the appellate court. Id. at 138-39.
"I In both Warner v. New York State Racing & Wagering Bd., 471 N.Y.S.2d 922
(A.D. 1985), and Gleason v. New York State Racing & Wagering Bd., 470 N.Y.S.2d 185
(A.D. 1983), the courts held that in revocation proceedings the licensees should have been
provided with prior statements of witnesses against them. Still, failure to provide the
statements was harmless error.
162 Belville, 473 N.E.2d 500.
163 588 P.2d 1290 (Or. Ct. App. 1979).
16 Id. at 1294.
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In Illinois, the authors crafted and the commission adopted a
rule requiring the parties to meet in advance of a commission
hearing and to stipulate to facts that are "not fairly in dispute.' 1 65
Designed to resemble a federal pre-trial order, the procedure forces
commission lawyers to put their cases together and provides the
representatives of licensees the opportunity to know in advance the
thrust of their opponents' cases. The rule serves the agency's goal
of expediting the process and at the same time imparts a sense of
fairness to the proceedings.
K. Evidence
While courts proclaim that all evidence at an administrative
hearing must be on the record and subject to cross-examination,
practitioners unfamiliar with administrative agency practice must
be extremely wary of the concept of "official notice' 1 66 and the
use of an agency's specialized knowledge and expertise. For ex-
ample, in Gregg, the commission made factual findings that the
court determined were not based on any evidence in the record. 6 7
Gregg involved the allegation that the licensee falsified the age of
a horse. The commission made findings to the effect that the
wagering public relied on accurate program information about the
age of horses. Obviously, the licensee had no opportunity to counter
these findings. Nonetheless, the court held that these findings fell
within the special knowledge of the commission and were not,
therefore, reversible error. 61 Only a full-crafted interrogatory or a
state statute prohibiting reliance on such non-record facts 69 can
prevent such damaging findings in a final commission order.
As with any trial, hearsay is an evidence issue in racing com-
mission cases. While most state statutes provide that the racing
M 11 ILL. ADM. CODE 204.110 (1985).
"6 Official notice generally includes matters subject to judicial notice along with those
matters falling within the specialized knowledge and expertise of the agency.
167 Gregg, 588 P.2d at 1293.
168 Id.
'6 See e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, para. 1012(c) (1985), which states:
Notice may be taken of generally recognized technical or scientific facts within
the agency's specialized knowledge. Parties shall be notified either before or
during the hearing or by reference in preliminary reports or otherwise, of the
material noticed, including any staff memoranda or data, and they shall be
afforded an opportunity to contest the material so noticed. The agency's
experience, technical competence and specialized knowledge may be utilized in
the evaluation of the evidence.
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commission is not bound by the technical rules of evidence, hearsay
is not a technical rule. Generally, however, the admission of hear-
say is not found to be reversible error unless a finding is based
solely on hearsay evidence. 170 Thus, the introduction of a laboratory
report as the basis for a finding that a horse was drugged, absent
live testimony from the chemist, has been held to be reversible
error.' 71 Many states have a rule providing that a laboratory report
of a prohibited drug in a post-race sample is prima facie evidence
that the trainer of the horse has violated the rule forbidding the
use or presence of such drugs. 72 In Pennsylvania, the rule for
thoroughbred racing goes further and makes the laboratory report
prima facie correct. 73
The issue in Worthington v. Commissioner, Department of
Agriculture, 74 was whether the Pennsylvania State Horse Racing
Commission could properly promulgate a rule that, in essence,
substituted a presumption for testimony as to the details of the
chain of evidence and chemical analysis. The majority noted the
urine sampling and testing process and the number of persons
involved in that process. The majority then concluded that the
testimony of three witnesses plus the presumption embodied in the
rule were sufficient to prove the presence of the drug "in the
absence of affirmative proof by Worthington of some error or
defect in any stage in the process of procuring and testing" the
sample. 175
170 Kramer v. New York State Racing & Wagering Bd., 500 N.Y.S.2d 728 (A.D. 1986);
Warner, 471 N.Y.S.2d 922.
"I See Barkley v. Louisiana State Racing Comm'n, 506 S.2d 580 (La. Ct. App. 1987);
Hall v. Louisiana State Racing Comm'n, 505 So. 2d 744 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (in globo
introduction of laboratory reports constituted a denial of trainer's rights to confront and
cross-examine). In Tufiarello v. Barry, 401 N.Y.S.2d 210 (A.D. 1978), the court reversed a
suspension where the only evidence that a horse was drugged was documents admitted
without proper foundation. But see Laborde v. Louisiana State Racing Comm'n, 506 So.
2d 634, 636 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (Schott, J., concurring), in which the concurring judge
argues that the commission had the right to present its documentary evidence and then rest,
shifting the burden to the licensee to produce contrary evidence. See also Miller v. Louisiana
State Racing Comm'n, 508 So. 2d 585, 586 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (Ward, J., concurring), in
which the author of the concurring opinion argues that the laboratory report was admissible
and that the right to cross-examine does not require the agency to produce a witness.
I" For a discussion of the rules making the trainer responsible, see Garrison & Klein,
Brennan Revisited: Trainer's Responsibility for Race Horse Drugging, 70 Ky. L.J. 1103
(1981-82).
'73 See infra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
'4 514 A.2d 311 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986).
173 Id. at 314. Although stated as an afterthought, the majority noted that the split
sample was verified by an independent laboratory and that Worthington failed to rebut the
presumption that he violated the trainer responsibility rule.
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The admissibility of laboratory reports from an out of state
laboratory has been an issue in several recent cases. In DeGroot
v. Arizona Racing Commission,176 Martinez v. State Racing Com-
mission,177 and Claridge v. New Mexico State Racing Commis-
sion, 178 post-race urine samples were sent out of state for testing
at laboratories other than the official laboratory. In all three cases,
the courts sustained the admissibility of the evidence, finding that
a reference to an official laboratory in agency rules did not preclude
evidence from other sources.
Racing commissions generally work closely with investigators
who are either their own employees, employees of state police units
charged with enforcing state racing statutes, or agents of the Thor-
oughbred Racing and Protective Bureau. Those relationships have
resulted in cases in which the issue was the admission of evidence
obtained illegally. Two of these cases resulted from the New Jersey
state police's "Operation Glue," which was aimed at jockeys in-
volved in fixing races.179 In the first of these cases, the New Jersey
criminal court dismissed charges against Rudolph Delguidice, Jr.,
finding that the state police had improperly entrapped him and
had manufactured its own criminal enterprise.1 80
Despite the dismissal of the criminal case, the New Jersey
Racing Commission (NJRC) refused to relicense Delguidice. Ap-
plying the United States v. Janis'81 balancing test, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey concluded that the evidence illegally obtained
by state police was admissible at a hearing before the NJRC
because: (1) the two governmental agencies were governed by dif-
ferent statutes; 82 (2) "the record reveals absolutely no connection
between the police entrapment and the Racing Commission;" '83
and (3) although the offending officers "could probably foresee
the use of the fruits of 'Operation Glue' " by the NJRC, "there
is nothing to suggest that the officers were actively motivated-
and it is unlikely that they were-to assist the Racing Commission
,76 686 P.2d 1301 (Ariz. App. 1984).
17 410 N.E.2d 740 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980).
763 P.2d 66 (N.M. 1988).
,,' Delguidice, 494 A.2d 1007; Kelly v. New Hampshire Pari-Mutuel Comm'n, 499
A.2d 994 (N.H. 1985).
Delguidice, 494 A.2d at 1008.
, 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
11 Delguidice, 494 A.2d at 1010.
I Id. at 1011.
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in its regulatory functions at the expense of forfeiting all criminal
indictments."' ' 84
Thus, the Delguidice court concluded that excluding the evi-
dence was unlikely to deter state police from future illegal conduct15
and that the harm to the racing industry from such exclusion would
be enormous. 86 The New Hampshire Supreme Court reached the
same conclusion when the results of the Operation Glue investi-
gation were offered into evidence before that state's racing com-
mission. 8 7 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Louisiana, again
employing the Janis test, held that evidence unlawfully obtained
by the Louisiana State Police Racing Investigations Unit could be
admitted and considered by the Louisiana State Racing Commis-
sion in an administrative disciplinary hearing. 88
Two racing commission cases have dealt with the effect of lost
evidence. In DeVitis v. New Jersey Racing Commission,'89 the
videotape of a race was destroyed when Freehold Raceway burned
down. The fire occurred after the administrative hearing but before
the commission had the opportunity to view the tape. Obviously,
there was no showing of bad faith or connivance on the agency's
part. DeVitis argued that he suffered manifest prejudice and harm
when the tape, which he characterized as objective evidence of the
race, was lost. The court, however, was not persuaded because the
administrative law judge had seen the videotape 90 and because
most of the testimony consisted of "verbatim narration of the
videotape."1 91
A trainer whose horse's urine sample tested positive argued
that charges against him should be dismissed because the blood
sample from his horse was destroyed. 92 Relying on authority from
a criminal case and commission rules that made urine testing
mandatory, the court reasoned that the missing evidence probably
would have been cumulative and that there was no "reasonable
19 Id.
"' Id. at 1011-12.
" Id. at 1013.
Kelly, 499 A.2d at 997.
z" Pullin, 484 So. 2d 105. But see Smith v. Pennsylvania State Horse Racing Comm'n,
501 A.2d 303 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985) (entrapment is a defense to an administrative charge
of race fixing).
"9 495 A.2d 457 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985).
'10 The administrative law judge's report was, however, rejected by the commission.
Id. at 461.
'9' Id. at 463.
19 Giles, 771 P.2d 1159.
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possibility" that evidence from the blood sample "would have
been exculpatory."1 93
Challenging the chain of evidence-from the collection of the
urine or the blood sample to the laboratory and through the several
stages of testing-is a typical avenue of attack for attorneys de-
fending persons charged with drugging or failing to guard against
drugged horses.194 The most notorious example of all such cases is
that of Jerry Graham, who faced ten charges of failing to guard
horses that were found to have raced with Sublimaze, a powerful
stimulant, in their systems. 195 Graham's attorneys argued that the
chain was broken because contrary to the commission's rules,
track-employed guards were not present when the urine samples
were collected. In addition, the attorneys alleged that betting rule
violations by the urine takers tainted the chain of evidence. Using
these arguments, Graham delayed serving a suspension for years.'96
Ultimately, however, his defense was unsuccessful because he failed
to demonstrate that the problems with the chain amounted to a
break in the chain of evidence. 97
While the subject matter of racing commission hearings may
be unique to pari-mutuel racing, aspects of the proceedings are in
many respects like any other civil or administrative case.
Worthington 98 is a splendid example. There the trainer was charged
with failure to guard a horse that tested positive for Acepromazine,
a tranquilizer. The trainer's only defense against such a charge was
testimony by the grooms who attended the horse on the day of the
race. Worthington argued that he was prejudiced by the twenty-
one-month delay between the date of notice of the violation and
the hearing. He argued that the delay made him unable to locate
two grooms' 99 who had worked for him on the date in question.
1 Id. at 1161. A contrary result was reached in Wilkey, 381 N.E.2d at 1380, when
the court reversed a lifetime suspension of a veterinarian charged with drugging horses
because of the board's failure to test a referee sample and weaknesses in its chain of
evidence. Id. at 1384-86.
See Claridge, 763 P.2d 66; Wilkey, 381 N.E.2d 1380.
" Graham v. Illinois Racing Bd., 495 N.E.2d 1013 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
11 Id. at 1013.
9 Only when a commission failed to introduce any testimony linking the horse to the
laboratory report has a commission case been overturned on the basis of the chain of
evidence. Paoli v. State Horse Racing Comm'n, 473 A.2d 243 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984).
I Worthington v. Comm'r, Dept of Agriculture, 514 A.2d 311 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1986).
I" In the often stratified society, and highly transient world, of thoroughbred racing,
the last names of grooms are not well known. The inability to locate a groom after a race
meeting ends is real and not at all surprising.
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The court, however, brushed this argument aside because Wor-
thington knew of the whereabouts of one of the grooms but made
no effort to subpoena him and he had not attempted to locate the
other groom.200
L. Penalties
The obvious purpose of an appeal is the reduction of the fine
or suspension imposed by the stewards. Such a result is not always
guaranteed. Numerous cases have held that racing commissions,
unless barred by their own rules,20 may increase the penalty im-
posed either because an increased penalty is permitted by statute, 2°2
or on the theory that the commission's hearing is de novo. 20 3
Moreover, the New York Racing and Wagering Board has adopted
a policy whereby penalties imposed by the stewards are decreased
if no appeal is taken; this policy has twice survived constitutional
challenge at intermediate appellate levels. 204
V. JUDICIAL REVIEw
Statutes defining the scope and nature of judicial review vary
from state to state. In Illinois, for example, the record before the
reviewing judge is limited to the record made before the adminis-
trative agency.2 5 In Ohio, however, the statute permits the intro-
duction of newly discovered evidence. 206
Worthington, 514 A.2d at 313. See also Brennan v. Monaghan, 166 N.Y.S.2d 190,
196 (A.D. 1957), where the applicant for an owner's license failed to make an adequate
showing that out of state character witnesses, in their depositions, would have testified as
he hoped. Therefore, failure to allow such depositions could not be said to be arbitrary,
capricious, or contrary to law.
I' See Ballard, 750 P.2d 286. The Wyoming rule provided that the commission could
"rescind or modify any penalty or decision" of the stewards. Id. at 291. The Commission,
without notice to Ballard, voted to increase a $200 fine and 45 day suspension. Upon being
enjoined to conduct a hearing in accordance with the Wyoming APA, they increased the
penalty to a two year suspension. The court held that "rescind or modify" did not mean
increase, id. at 291, and that an amendment to the statute after the original suspension
could not be applied retroactively to justify the increased suspension. Id. at 291-92.
Pence, 705 P.2d 1067, contains a scholarly analysis of the double jeopardy and res
judicata claims made in this context; see also Poisson, 287 A.2d 852.
203 Ray, 447 N.E.2d 886.
2" Belanger, 494 N.Y.S.2d 451; Crawford v. New York State Racing and Wagering
Bd., 473 N.Y.S.2d 601 (A.D. 1984).
ILL. Rnv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 3-110; see also Benefiel v. Illinois Racing Bd., 504
N.E.2d 827 (IIl. App. Ct. 1987); Lamar v. Illinois Racing Bd., 370 N.E.2d 1241 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1977).
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2505.31 (Baldwin 1987).
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A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Preservation of Issues
1. Time for Court Review
Before one can challenge a racing commission decision in court,
one must first exhaust administrative remedies. Knowing how to
exhaust those remedies can be tricky. In B. T. Energy Corp. v.
Marcus,2°7 for example, a party who lost before the Nebraska
Racing Commission filed a motion for rehearing with the commis-
sion. 208 The rehearing was held, the motion denied, and the party
then sought judicial review under the applicable Nebraska law.209
The Supreme Court of Nebraska held that the complaint was not
timely filed as the applicable law required that the suit be instituted
within thirty days of the final decision of the agency. Since the
racing statute did not give the commission any power to reconsider
a decision, the time started running from the date of the original
decision and not from the date on which the motion to reconsider
was denied. 210
On the other hand, an Arizona appellate court has held that
where the racing statute permits a licensee to request rehearing or
review, the party must avail himself of that right before seeking
relief in the courts.211 The Arizona court noted that the "purpose
of this exhaustion of remedies doctrine is twofold: to allow an
administrative agency to exercise its expertise over the subject
matter and perhaps more importantly, to permit the agency to
correct any mistakes or errors that may have occurred during the
administrative process. ' ' 212
2. Injunctions and Other Remedies
The exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine also applies
where a party seeks injunctive relief in the courts after23 the
382 N.W.2d 616 (Neb. 1986)
Id. at 618.
20 Id.
210 Id. at 619
211 Oliver v. Arizona Dep't of Racing, 708 P.2d 764 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).
212 Id. at 767 (citation omitted). Presumably, when the legislature does not grant an
agency the opportunity to rehear a matter, the legislature adopts the policy that agencies
should not have the luxury of making mistakes at the expense of regulated parties and
therefore regulators should take great care before acting.
213 An injunction prohibiting certain hearings by the Illinois Racing Board and the
stewards was reversed on direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court in Graham v. Illinois
Racing Bd., 394 N.E.2d 1148 (Ill. 1979).
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stewards' ruling, but before filing a request for hearing with the
commission. 214 In such a case, it has been held that the party must
still exhaust his administrative remedies even if, as in the case of
a jockey suspension, the suspension is imposed prior to the oppor-
tunity for a commission hearing. 215
In general, the courts are without jurisdiction to review an
agency's decision where a party affected by that decision has failed
to exhaust administrative remedies. 21 6 More specifically, the Illinois
Supreme Court tackled the issue of injunctions in an exclusion217
case in which two harness drivers were barred from the grounds
of Fairmount Park Race Track by both the Illinois Racing Board's
stewards and by track management after the drivers' indictment
for race fixing.2 8 The court held that where a party seeks injunctive
relief on the basis of a statute's unconstitutional application but
fails to attack the statute on its face, injunctive relief is not
available unless administrative remedies have been exhausted. 21 9
Obviously, if the racing commission lacks jurisdiction to entertain
a matter, a party may proceed directly to court because there are
no administrative remedies to exhaust. 220
3. Preserving Issues for Appeal
Generally, a matter not raised at the trial court level may not
be raised on appeal. Similarly, a matter not raised before the racing
commission generally cannot be raised for the first time on judicial
review. 221 This legal principle cuts both ways and, in one case, a
214 When racing commissioners grant stays of stewards' suspensions or when appeals
to the commission automatically stay the enforcement of a penalty, immediate action in the
courts is unnecessary. Commission policy on this issue varies widely. The authors suspect
that there is a relation between the number of litigated injunction cases and the refusal of
certain commissions to grant stays.
211 State Racing Comm'n v. McManus, 476 P.2d 767 (N.M. 1970).
216 Id. at 772.
2I An exclusion is an order by a racing commission, its stewards, or a race track
barring a licensee from being physically present on race track property. See Kropp, Landen
& Donath, supra note 57; HTA monograph, supra note 57.
218 Phillips v. Graham, 427 N.E. 2d 550 (Ill. 1981).
219 Id. at 557.
Sobolewski v. Louisville Downs, Inc., 609 S.W.2d 943 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980); see
also Youst v. Longo, 729 P.2d 728 (Cal. 1987) (California Horse Racing Board does not
have statutory authority to award general tort damages, therefore, party need not exhaust
administrative remedies by first seeking such relief from the board).
221 Poisson v. State Harness Racing Comm'n, 287 A.2d 852 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1972)
(licensee may not object in reviewing court to increase by racing commission of penalty
imposed by the stewards when issue not raised before the agency); Belville v. Illinois Racing
Bd., 473 N.E. 2d 500, 505 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (Issue of identity and reliability of informant
waived because not raised at hearing).
[VOL. 78
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
reviewing court has refused to permit a racing commission to assert
a rule as a basis for a license revocation when the rule was neither
cited to nor relied upon at the commission hearing.m Racing
commission decisions, like those of other administrative agencies,
are enhanced when accompanied by adequate findings of fact and
conclusions of law.?2 The absence of findings on a crucial issue
has been characterized as precluding judicial review, resulting in a
remand to a racing commission.? 4 The goal of explicit findings is
meaningful judicial review. 225
B. Attorneys' Fees
Those who practice before state racing commissions should
carefully analyze relevant state APAs and judicial review laws. For
example, the Illinois APA permits a party who succeeds in invali-
dating an agency rule "for any reason" to recover "the reasonable
expenses of the litigation, including reasonable attorney's fees.''2 6
Thus, when the Illinois Racing Board's warrantless search rule was
successfully challenged, the appellate court confirmed an award of
$10,625 in attorney fees and $151.80 in court costs.27
The owners who invalidated a Washington Racing Commission
rule2 were not so fortunate. There the court found no statutory
authority under Washington's administrative review statute for the
award of attorney's fees nor any showing of bad faith by the
commission that would justify the award of fees on equitable
principles.229
C. Review of Quasi-Judicial Administrative Decisions
The courts review three aspects of racing commission decisions:
(1) review of the agency's findings of fact; (2) review of the
m Smith v. Pennsylvania State Horse Racing Comm'n, 501 A.2d 303, 307 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1985).
n See infra notes 230-45 and accompanying text.
2u Pinsley v. New York State Racing & Wagering Bd., 423 N.Y.S.2d 307 (A.D. 1979).
22 Norwood v. Pennsylvania State Horse Racing Comm'n, 328 A.2d 198, 204 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1974) (court admonished racing commission "to be more specific in both its
findings [of fact] and conclusions [of law]" but sustained decision).
21 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 8, para. 1014(b) (1985).
2" Hansen v. Illinois Racing Board, 534 N.E.2d 658 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989). After the
appellate court decision, Hansen also petitioned for his fees and costs in defending 'the
appeal.
2n See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
22 Clark v. Washington Horse Racing Comm'n, 720 P.2d 831 (Wash. 1986).
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agency's conclusions of law; and (3) review of the agency's exercise
of discretion. The standard of review applied depends upon the
nature of the particular issue.
1. Standard of Review for Factual Findings
The attempt to define with precision the level of proof required
at a racing commission hearing may be an acceptable scholarly
endeavor, but the effort hardly provides useful guidance for the
practitioner. The broad brush definition of the standard of review
of factual findings is that the courts will not re-weigh the evidence? 0
because the findings of fact of an administrative agency are deemed
prima facie true and correct 231 and matters of credibility are re-
served for the trier of fact. 232 Reviewing courts, therefore, will
sustain an agency's findings of fact if the findings are supported
by substantial evidence,233 substantial credible evidence, 234 sufficient
credible evidence, 235 sufficient evidence, 236 legal evidence, 237 reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence, 238 competent, material, and
substantial evidence, 239 or the manifest weight of the evidence. 240
2" Belanger v. New York State Racing and Wagering Bd., 471 N.Y.S.2d 690, 691
(A.D. 1984); DeGroot v. Arizona Racing Comm'n, 686 P.2d 1301, 1305 (Ariz. App. Ct.
1984).
-1 Benefiel, 504 N.E.2d 827, 829; Belville, 473 N.E.2d 500, 504.
r3 Warner v. New York State Racing & Wagering Bd., 471 N.Y.S.2d 922, 923 (A.D.
1984).
2' Kentucky State Racing Comm'n v. Fuller, 481 S.W.2d 298, 307-09 (Ky. 1972);
Solimeno v. State Racing Comm'n, 509 N.E.2d 1167, 1173 (Mass. 1987). In Pennsylvania,
see, e.g., Reichard v. State Harness Racing Comm'n, 499 A.2d 727, 728 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1985); McKenna v. Pennsylvania State Horse Racing Comm'n, 476 A.2d 505, 506 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1984); Norwood, 328 A.2d at 203 ("Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla"). In New York, see Warner, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 923 ("Since substantial evidence
exists to support the Board's determination, it must be sustained irrespective of whether a
similar quantum of evidence is available to support another conclusion."); MacRae v. New
York State Racing & Wagering Bd., 368 N.Y.S.2d 313, 314 (A.D. 1975). In Oregon, see
Gregg v. Oregon Racing Comm'n, 588 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Or. Ct. App. 1979).
_ Carruthers v. Board of Horse Racing, 700 P.2d 179, 181 (Mont. 1985).
"I DeVitis v. New Jersey Racing Comm'n, 495 A.2d 457, 460-61 (N.J. Super. A.D.
1985) ("Where there is substantial evidence in the record to support more than one result,
it is the agency's choice which governs.").
26 Hall v. Louisiana State Racing Comm'n, 505 So. 2d 744, 746 (La. App. 4 Cir.
1987).
21 Lombardo v. DiSandro, 103 A.2d 557, 559 (R.I. 1954).
21 Dewbre v. Ohio State Racing Comm'n, 476 N.E.2d 667, 669 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
29 Taylor v. Hazel Park Racing Ass'n, 371 N.W.2d 447, 450 (Mich. App. 1985).
m See supra note 231.
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Lawyers may reasonably differ as to the exact meaning of these
words but Kentucky's highest court has expressed the following
definition:
The test of substantiality of evidence is whether when taken alone
or in light of all the evidence it has sufficient probative value to
induce conviction in the minds of reasonable men.241
2. Standard of Review for Conclusions of Law
The courts do not accord as much deference to an administra-
tive agency's conclusions of law. Agency rules enjoy a presumption
of validity2 2 and the courts afford substantial weight to the agen-
cy's view of its enabling statute when the statute is not clear.23
However, when the issue in a case is purely legal, reviewing courts
do not hesitate to substitute their view for that of the agency. 4
The agency's decision must be in accordance with the law.25
3. Standard of Review: Discretion
The exercise of a racing commission's discretion with respect
to penalties2 has been challenged on many occasions. In general,
the reviewing courts test the wisdom of agency discretion by deter-
mining whether or not the discretion has been abused 247 or whether
21 Fuller, 481 S.W.2d at 308 (citation omitted). The record in Fuller consisted of 1,162
pages of proceedings before the stewards and 2,860 pages of proceedings before the Com-
mission. Id. at 299. The attorney for Fuller has told one of the authors that his client spent
a fortune "to prove that the Kentucky Racing Commission can believe whatever it wants
to believe." But see Swift v. New York State Racing & Wagering Bd:, 473 N.Y.S.2d 632,
633 ("Substantial evidence 'does not rise from bare surmise, conjecture, speculation.' "
(citation omitted)). See also Viera v. Illinois Racing Bd., 382 N.E.2d 462 (Ill. App. Ct.
1978) and Pletcher v. Illinois Racing Bd., 372 N.E.2d 1075 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978), which are
two rare examples of appellate courts reversing racing commission findings of fact.
142 Heavner v. Illinois Racing Bd., 432 N.E.2d. 290, 294 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); Clark,
720 P.2d at 833.
2A Carruthers, 700 P.2d at 181.
2, See id.; Clark, 720 P.2d at 833.
24 Brown v. Pennsylvania State Horse Racing Comm'n, 499 A.2d 1132, 1133 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1985).
24 The Minnesota legislature has required the Minnesota Racing Commission to estab-
lish by rule "a graduated schedule of civil fines." MIwN. STAT. ANN. § 240.22 (1990 Supp.).
24 Pence v. Idaho State Racing Comm'n, 705 P.2d 1067 (Idaho. App. 1985) (one year
suspension and $500 fine, reduced by a $300 credit, for possession of electric prodding
device not an abuse of discretion); Ogden-Fairmount, Inc. v. Illinois Racing Bd., 518
N.E.2d 120, 128 (Ill. 1987) (15 month exclusion of horse owner who submitted spurious
bids for filing with racing board not abuse of discretion); Owens v. La. State Racing
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the agency's action has been arbitrary, capricious, or unreasona-
ble.28
The severe penalties imposed in recent years by the Illinois
Racing Board have prompted several challenges to the Board's
discretion. While the lifetime suspensions of two jockeys for pos-
session of electrical goading devices have been sustained, 249 a life-
time suspension of a trainer who failed to guard ten horses against
the administration of sublimaze was deemed overly harsh by the
court, given the trainer's twenty-seven-year unblemished record and
the penalties imposed by the board in other failure-to-guard cases.2 . 0
Recently, an Illinois appellate court explained that "[t]he test...
is not whether [a reviewing court] would impose a lesser penalty if
it were making a decision in the first instance, rather, the test is
whether, in view of the circumstances, the agency acted unreason-
ably or arbitrarily.''251
None of these terms provide clear guidance to racing commis-
sioners or the parties who appear before them. The guidepost is
probably best expressed by a New Jersey court that noted that a
penalty may not be "so disproportionate to the offense as to be
'shocking to one's sense of fairness.' '252 Moreover, "[e]qual pro-
tection does not require that each trainer found guilty of the same
Comm'n, 466 So. 2d 764, 767 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (30 day suspension of trainer for
procaine positive testing not an abuse of discretion). Briley v. Louisiana State Racing
Comm'n, 410 So. 2d 802 (La. App. Ct. 1982) (three year suspension of trainer with three
amphetamine positives and prior record of rule violations, including prior medication
violations, sustained).
24 Norwood, 328 A.2d at 204 (permanent license revocation and $5,000 fine warranted
where licensee had participated in or had knowledge of administration of prohibited drugs
and the switching of urine samples and had personal possession of hypodermic needles).
24 Belville, 473 N.E.2d 500; Feliciano v. Illinois Racing Bd., 443 N.E.2d 261 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1982).
20 Graham, 495 N.E.2d 1013. The other cases were Kline v. Illinois Racing Bd., 469
N.E.2d 667 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (two concurrent 90 day suspensions for scopolamine
positives) and Ray v. Illinois Racing Board, 447 N.E.2d 886 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (three
consecutive 90 day suspensions for sublimaze positives).
251 Edwards v. Illinois Racing Bd., 543 N.E.2d 172, 176-77 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)
(fourteen consecutive nine-month suspensions of trainer sustained where 14 post-race samples
contained isopyrin, sulindac, and etorphine and trainer had multiple prior violations includ-
ing violations of medication rules).
212 King v. New Jersey Racing Comm'n, 501 A.2d 173, 175 (N.J. Super A.D. 1985)
(quoting Pella v. Bd. of Education, Etc., 34 N.Y.2d 222, 313 N.E.2d 321 (1974)) (six-month
suspension for intentionally driving not to win sustained in light of past record of infractions,
but case reversed and remanded on other grounds). In Pennsylvania State Horse Racing
Comm'n v. DiSanto, 372 A.2d 487 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977) the court concluded that there
was mitigating evidence in the record and reduced a five-year license revocation to a two-
year suspension because five years was too severe.
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offense be given the same penalty, as each case must stand upon
its own circumstances."2 3
Unfortunately for licensees, racing commissions rarely bifurcate
hearings. In a bifurcated proceeding the commission would first
determine whether there was a violation. If a violation is found,
the commission would then determine the appropriate penalty.
Unless the penalty phase of the proceeding is separated, penalties
may be imposed without deliberation 254 because unsuspecting li-
censees have not yet presented evidence to mitigate the severity of
their penalties. The right to be heard in mitigation, after having
been found guilty of a violation, is fundamental in our society and
the failure of a commission to recognize this right offends the sense
of fairness.
21 Salicos v. Louisiana State Racing Comm'n, 482 So. 2d 117, 118 (La. App. Ct.
1986), relying on Loftin v. Louisiana State Racing Comm'n, 449 So. 2d 136 (La. App. Ct.
1984).
21 In Briley, 410 So. 2d 802, 807 (La. App. Ct. 1982), the court found no abuse of
discretion when the commission imposed sentence without deliberation after hearing the
witnesses. The court reasoned that any abuse of discretion could be rectified on appeal.
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